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Abstract— our future work will be based on Click-based
graphical password schemes require a user to click on a
set of points on one or more presented background
images. With the Pass Points and to create users to a
password by clicking five ordered points anywhere on
the given image. CaRP addresses a number of security
problems altogether, such as online guessing attacks,
relay attacks, and, if combined with dual-view
technologies, shoulder-surfing attacks. Notably, a CaRP
password can be found only probabilistically by
automatic online guessing attacks even if the password is
in the search set. To log in, users must correctly the
repeated sequence of clicks, with each click falling within
the acceptable tolerance of original point. To
implemented this aspect, along with a scheme converting
the user-entered graphical password into a
cryptographic verification key and “robust
discretization” scheme. It consisted of three overlapping
grids (invisible to the user) used to determine whether
the click-points are login attempt were close enough to
the original points to be accepted.
Key words: Graphical password, hotspots, CaRP, Captcha,
dictionary attack ,security primitive, password guessing
attack, password.
I. Introduction
The security and the usability of problems inherent in text-
based password schemes have resulted in the development
of graphica password schemes as a possible alternative.
However, most of the current graphical password schemes
are vulnerable to spy wer ewhich is a program that gathers
information about a computer sand relays that information
back to a third party. There have been some schemes which
have made contributions to the development of graphical
password in term of spyware resistance. Using a challenge-
response protocol, they have an advantage in that they are
resistant to replay attacks. Namely, even the third party who
observes a successful login session cannot perform a replay
attack. Though they have a positive effect on protecting
users’ password, they are not yet sufficient to stop attackers
from harvesting passwords. A CAPTCHA (Completely
Automated Public Turing tests to tell Computers and
Humans Apart) is a program that generates and grades tests
that are human solvable, but are beyond the capabilities of
current computer programs [4].CAPTCHA uses open
algorithms based on hard AI problems, and has been
discussed in text-based password schemes to resist
dictionary attack [5]. Innovatively, we explore CAPTCHA
in the context of graphical passwords to provide better
protection against spyware. As long as the underlying open
AI problems are not solved, CAPTCHA is a promising way
to resist spy ware attack in graphical password schemes.
Based on this key idea, we have proposed a new graphical
password scheme using CAPTCHA, designed to be strongly
resistant to spyware attack, either by purely automated
software or via human participation. A preliminary user
study indicates that our scheme needs to improve in terms of
login time and memo ability.
However, this new paradigm has achieved just a limited
success as compared with the cryptographic primitives
based on hard math problems and their wide applications. Is
it possible to create any new security primitive based on
hard AI problems? This is a challenging and interesting
open problem. In this paper, we introduce a new security
primitive based on hard AI problems, namely, a novel
family of graphical password systems integrating Captcha
technology, which we call CaRP (Captcha as graphical
Passwords). CaRP is click-based graphical passwords,
where a sequence of clicks on an image issued to derive a
password. Unlike other click-based graphical passwords,
images used in CaRP are Captcha challenges, and a new
CaRP image is generated for every login attempt. The
notion of CaRP is simple but generic. CaRP can have
multiple instantiations. In theory, any Captcha scheme rely
ingon multiple-object classification can be converted to a
CaRP scheme. We present exemplary CaRPs built on both
text Captcha and image-recognition Captcha. One of them is
a text CaRP wherein a password is a sequence of characters
like a text password, but entered by clicking the right charac
ters equence on CaRP images. CaRP offers protection
against online dictionary attacks on passwords, which have
been for long time a major security threat for various
online services. This threat is wide spread and considered as
a top cyber security risk [13]. Defence against online
dictionary attacks is a more subtle problem than it might
appear. Intuitive countermeasures such as throttling logon
attempts do not work well for two reasons:
1) It causes denial-of-service attacks (which were exploited
to lock highest bidders out in final minutes of eBay
auctions) and incurs expensive helpdesk costs for account
reactivation.
2) It is vulnerable to global password attacks where by
adversaries intend to break into any account rather thana
specific one, and thus try each password candidate on
multiple accounts and ensure that the number of trials on
each account is below the threshold to avoid triggering
account lock out.CaRP also offers protection against relay
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attacks, an increasing threat to bypass Captchas protection,
wherein Captch a challenges are relayed to humans to solve.
Koobface [33]was a relay attack to bypass Face book’s
Captcha in creating new accounts. CaRP is robust to
shoulder-surfing attacks if combined with dual-view
technologies. CAPTCHA (Completely Automated Public
Turing tests to tell Computers and Humans Apart) is a
program that generate sand grades tests that are human
solvable, but beyond the capabilities of current computer
programs [27]. The robust ness of CAPTCHA is found in its
strength in resisting automaticadv ersarial attacks, automatic
adversarial attacks, and it hasmany applications for practical
security, including online polls,free email services, search
engine bots, worms and spam, andpreventing dictionary
attacks [27]. Our proposal creates aninnovative use of
CAPTCHA in the context of graphicalpasswords to provide
better password protection againstspyware attacks.
In this paper, we have proposed a new authenticationscheme
combining graphical passwords with text-basedCAPTCHA.
The scheme is easy for humans but makes italmost
impossible for automated programs to harvestpasswords.
The novel scheme is friendly for legitimate users,while
simultaneously raising the time and computer capacitycost
to adversaries by several orders of magnitude.
Experiments showed its effectiveness, but also indicated
furtherresearch would improve its usability.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
2briefly reviews related work. Sections 3 and 4 present
ourscheme and analyses its security. Section 6 provides the
resultsof experiments described in section 5. Section 7
discussesadditional observations and possible extension to
our scheme.Conclusions and future work are addressed in
section 8.
II. Related Works
Most current graphical password schemes, such as require
users to enter the password directly,typically by clicking or
drawing. Hence, passwords are easilyexposed to a third
party who has the opportunity to record asuccessful
authentication session. There have been a fewgraphical
password schemes devoted to secure passwordsagainst
spyware attacks. In the following, severalrepresentatives
will be described.Man, proposed that users remember a
number oftext strings as well as several images as pass-
objects. To passthe authentication, users should enter the
unique codescorresponding to the displayed pass-object
variants and a codeindicating the relative location of the
pass-objects in referenceto a pair of eyes. It is relatively
hard to crack this kind ofpassword, but the complex
memory requirement is an obstacleto its popularity.In [26],
users need to recognize pass-objects and clickinside the
convex hull formed by all of the pass-objects. Ifproperly
designed, this method can provide good security.
In essence, the above methods adopt a challenge-
responseprotocol to confuse the spyware. They can prevent
thepasswords being cracked by the spyware and falling into
thehand of an adversary, along with resisting replay
attacks.Taking the previous mechanisms for reference, our
scheme alsouses a challenge-response protocol to enhance
security. But,unlike these methods, our scheme innovatively
applies
CAPTCHA to graphical passwords to create a highly
secureauthentication method.
Figure1. The interface of the basic scheme (The pass-images
are circled).
III. Our Scheme
Our approach is motivated by the observation that effective
spyware attacks are launched from automated programs. We
realized that to increase security passwords should be
accompanied by a product of a “computation” that is
difficult for machines. As an authentication method, the
scheme should also be user friendly. Considering these
requirements, we applied CAPTCHA to graphical password
schemes. CAPTCHA is a program designed to test whether
the user is a computer or a human, by creating a task easy
for humans but difficult for machines [27]. It is based on
hard AI problems which cannot be solved with any greater
accuracy than what is currently known to the AI community
[31]. CAPTCHA is now almost a standard security
mechanism for addressing undesirable or malicious Internet
bot programs [28] and major web sites such as Google,
Yahoo and Microsoft all have their own CAPTCHAs. The
state-of-the-art CAPTCHAs mainly include three types:
text-based schemes, sound-based schemes and image-based
schemes. The most widely deployed schemesare text-based
CAPTCHAs and we also use this in our schemes
(a) The interface of register.
fter introducing a basic scheme with a hidden safety
loophole, we will describe an improved scheme that is
designed to fill the hole. The performances of the both
schemes depend extremely on the property of CAPTCHA.
A. The Basic Scheme
The basic scheme embeds a text-based CAPTCHA into a
simple graphical password scheme. Each image has a
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CAPTCHA instance called adjunctive string and the strings
are generated at random by the system. In the register phase,
users are required to select and remember images as their
password images (pass-images). To be authenticated, users
need to distinguish his/her pass-images as well as solve a
test by recognizing and typing the adjunctive string below
each pass image. For example, in Figure 1, assume the three
images with red circles are pass-images, users should input
the adjunctive strings ‘mewo’, ‘xnco’ and ‘nvso’ correctly
to pass the authentication. For simplicity, we assume that
the CAPTCHA here is an ideal CAPTCHA that is hard
enough for machines to recognize while easy for humans to
solve. In the case that adversaries are automated programs
without human intervention, the scheme has a strong
resistance to replay attack. Namely, even if it observes a
successful login, a spyware program cannot launch a replay
attack. This can be illustrated from two aspects. Firstly,
pass-images are entered by typing random adjunctive strings
rather than clicking directly. In other words, the entered
strings are the trap instead of the real password. Secondly,
machines have no ability to recognize the characters
embedded in each image. It follows that it is rather difficult
for an automated program to find pass images according to
the recorded strings. The loophole in this scheme occurs if
the adversary is a person and the spyware is an assistant.
The password will be in danger because CAPTCHA is easy
for a person. In this case, the person can see what the
spyware has gathered, a successful login scene along with
the entered characters. Then, a person can crack the
passwords without much effort. For 26 lower case letters in
the scheme, the probability that different images have the
same string is 1/456976, which can be ignored. One useful
method for password cracking is to divide the gathered
strings with four characters into groups and then compare
each segment with that below each image. To close this loop
hole, we constructed an improved version.
B. The Improved Scheme
The vulnerability of the basic scheme lies in two factors.
One is the requirement that CAPTCHAs should be human
userfriendly. The other is the reversible relationship
betweenpasswords and what is entered. That is, pass-images
determinewhat is entered and vice versa. What’s more, we
noted that thereversible relationship depends greatly on the
fact that theprobability of different images with the same
adjunctive stringis close to zero and that the trap of each
pass-image has auniform length. While the former is
necessary for a popularauthentication scheme, we are
encouraged to disturb the latter.One possible method is
increasing the probability bydecreasing the types of letters
or the length of adjunctive string.This method might work,
but it will increase the probability ofillegal login by random
guessing. Thereby, it is ineffective as asecurity method. Our
alternative is to replace the uniformlength with a random
one predefined by users. In other words,the number of
characters entered is determined by users.In our improved
scheme, users are required to select andremember letter
positions, ie choose several specific letterpositions within a
string of letters; for example, letters in 1st, 4thand 5th
position in the string will become the code. These
letterpositions are the called pass-positions for each pass-
image.
During the authentication, users should enter the
charactersshown in the pass-positions of each pass-image.
An example isshown in Figure 2.In Figure 2(b), the three
circled images are pass-images, thestrings with them are
‘qarwrxex’, ‘heeqseio’, and ‘mvgqqebh’respectively, and
the corresponding pass-positions are (1, 2, 4),(4, 6, 8), and
(3, 5) shown in Figure 2 (a). A user can input
anycombination of the three sequences, ‘qaw’, ‘qeo’, and
‘gq’ tobe authenticated successfully.This scheme is strongly
resistant to attacks launched byhumans with spyware, while
simultaneously preserving theadvantages of graphical
password schemes. The relatedsecurity analysis will be
given in the following section andusability problems will be
discussed in Section 5, 6 and 7through experiments.
IV. Security Analysis Of The Improved Scheme
A. Capability to Withstand Spyware
There are many different kinds of spyware [1, 2], such
asbrowser hijackers, keyloggers and spybots. We have
focusedon the spyware cluster that runs in the background
collectingpasswords. The security of our scheme relies on
the robustnessof CAPTCHA in resisting automatic
adversarial attacks.However, it is not clear whether there is
a true CAPTCHA atall and some reports show that some
text-based CAPTCHAscan be partly or almost broken by
automatic programs [3, 29, and 30]. With the assumption
that spyware is capable of detectingand recording screen
snapshots, entered strings and the systemfeedback, we will
analyze the security of the improved schemefrom two
extreme aspects. Firstly, it is impossible for machinesto
solve the CAPTCHAs in our scheme, the ideal
case.Secondly, CAPTCHAs can be completely solved by
machines,the worst case.Under ideal conditions, spywares
have no chance of gainingthe passwords without human
invention, similar to thediscussion in sections 3.1. If people
are involved, spywareassistance can help users to break the
scheme. What thespyware needs to do is to catch the
password string entered bythe legal user. To crack
passwords, adversaries should solve theCAPTCHA himself
or by employing human workers. It iscostly to obtain a
password because the pass-positions of eachpass-image are
unknown and thereby it is hard to manually findthe
correspondence between pass-images and what is entered.
Even for the lowest level security, adversaries must
recognize400 CAPTCHAs. In this case, there are three pass-
images, eachwith a pass-position and then the attacker can
easily divide theentered string into three segments each with
a specificcharacter. The probability of a letter displayed
below oneimage is 0.2726100 images on screen in our
scheme with about 27 imageswhich have a common specific
character. That is, there are 27candidates including a pass-
image and 26 decoys. Through interaction, the attacker
cangradually get rid of all the decoys. For the second
observation,third observation, there will only be about three
CAPTCHAswhich contain the specific character. The
attacker can find theusers passwords correctly in four
sessions. So the attacker mustsolve approximately 400
CAPTCHAs and conduct manyobservations and
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comparisons, which is time consuming andcostly. More
complex work is required if the correspondencebetween
pass-images and entered strings are unknown.Therefore, our
scheme has a strong resistance against spywaresunder the
ideal environment.
Projecting the worst condition, that CAPTCHAs can
becompletely solved by machines, it is possible that
spywarescould crack passwords because each successful
login revealssome information about the password. One
method is to dividethe entered strings into different
segments and find thepasswords from images which contain
the same segments fromanalyzing different login sessions.
Another method is to findthe common images by excluding
images without any characterof the entered string. For
instance, when the passwords lie inthe lowest security level,
it is possible to crack the passwords infour sessions, as
discussed above.This worst case scenario is not probable,
unless spywarescan gather sufficient information in the
background and canbreak CAPTCHAs quickly. Currently,
no programs can break aCAPTCHA automatically in a short
time. Furthermore, even if the currently applied
CAPTCHAs are effectively broken, therewill always be
versions with higher security in production. Inaddition, as
long as the hard AI problems underlyingCAPTCHA are
unsolved, successful attacks will advance thedevelopment of
more robust CAPTCHAs.Therefore, it is demonstrated that
our scheme is secureagainst spyware as long as CAPTCHAs
cannot be broken byautomated programs. Any defeated
CAPTCHAs will besubstituted by more robust ones. If
humans are involved, thecost of cracking a password is
significantly increased.
Automatic Online Guessing Attacks
In automatic online guessing attacks, the trial and error
process is executed automatically whereas dictionaries can
be constructed manually. If we ignore negligible
probabilities, CaRP with underlying CPA-secure Captcha
has the following properties:
1. Internal object-points on one CaRP image are
computationally-independent of internal object-points on
another CaRP image. Particularly, clickable points on one
image are computationally-independent of clickable points
on another image.
2. Eq. (3) holds, i.e., trials in guessing attacks are mutually
independent. The first property can be proved by
contradiction. Assume that the property does not hold, i.e.,
there exists an internal object-point α on one image A that is
non-negligibly dependent of an internal object-point β on
another image
B. An adversary can exploit this dependency to launch the
following chosen-pixel attack. In the learning phase, image
A is used to learn the object that contains point α. In the
testing phase, point β on image B is used to query the oracle.
Since point α is non-negligibly dependent of point β, this
CPA-experiment would result in a success probability non
negligibly higher than a random guess, which contradicts
the CPA-secure assumption. We conclude that the first
property holds. The second property is a consequence of the
first property since user-clicked internal object-points in one
trial are computationally-independent of user-clicked
internal object-points in another trial due to the first
property. We have ignored background and boundary
object-points since clicking any of them would lead to
authentication failure. Eq. (3) indicates that automatic online
guessing attacks can find a password only probabilistically
no matter how many trials are executed. Even if the
password guess to be tested in a trial is the actual password,
the trial has a slim chance to succeed since a machine
cannot recognize the objects in the CaRP image to input the
password correctly. This is a great contrast to automatic
online guessing attacks on existing graphical passwords
which are deterministic,
i.e., that each trial in a guessing attack can always determine
if the tested password guess is the actual password or not,
and all the password guesses can be determined by a limited
number of trials. Particularly, brute-force attacks or
dictionary attacks with the targeted password in the
dictionary would always succeed in attacking existing
graphical passwords.
Relay Attacks
Relay attacks may be executed in several ways. Captcha
challenges can be relayed to a high-volume Website hacked
or controlled by adversaries to have human surfers solve the
challenges in order to continue surfing the Website, or
relayed to sweatshops where humans are hired to solve
Captcha challenges for small payments. Is CaRP vulnerable
to relay attacks? We make the same assumption as Van
Oorschot and Stubblebine [15] in discussing CbPA-
protocol’s robustness to relay attacks: a person will not
deliberately participate in relay attacks unless paid for the
task. The task to perform and the image used in CaRP are
very different from those used to solve a Captcha challenge.
This noticeable difference makes it hard for a person to
mistakenly help test a password guess by attempting to
solve a Captcha challenge. Therefore it would be unlikely to
get a large number of unwitting people to mount human
guessing attacks on CaRP. In addition, human input
obtained by performing a Captcha task on a CaRP image is
useless for testing a password guess. If sweatshops are hired
to mount human guessing attack, we can make a rough
estimation of the cost. We assume that the cost to click one
password on a CaRP image is the same as solving a Captcha
challenge. Using the lowest retail price, $1, reported [34] to
solve 1000 Captcha challenges, the average cost to break a
26-bit password is 0.5 ・ 226 ・ 1/1000, or about 33.6
thousand US dollars.
Shoulder-Surfing Attacks
Shoulder-surfing attacks are a threat when
graphical passwords are entered in a public place such as
bank ATM machines. CaRP is not robust to shoulder-
surfing attacks by itself. However, combined with the
following dual-view technology, CaRP can thwart shoulder-
surfing attacks. By exploiting the technical limitation that
commonly-used LCDs show varying brightness and color
depending on the viewing angle, the dual-view technology
can use software alone to display two images on a LCD
screen concurrently, one public image viewable at most
view-angles, and the other private image viewable only at a
specific view-angle [38]. When a CaRP image is displayed
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as the “private” image by the dual-view system, a shoulder-
surfing attacker can capture user clicked points on the
screen, but cannot capture the “private” CaRP image that
only the user can see. However, the obtained user-clicked
points are useless for another login attempt, where a new,
computationally-independent image will be used and thus
the captured points will not represent the correct password
on the new image anymore. To the contrary, common
implementations of graphical password schemes such as
Pass Points use a static input image in the same location of
the screen for each login attempt. Although this image can
be hidden as the private image by the dual-view technology
from being captured by a shoulder surfer, the user-clicked
points captured in a successful login are still the valid
password for next login attempt. That is, capturing the
points alone is sufficient for an effective attack in this case.
In general, the higher the correlation of user-clicked points
between different login attempts is, the less effective
protection the dual-view technology would provide to
thwart shoulder surfing attacks.
Others
CaRP is not bulletproof to all possible attacks. CaRP is
vulnerable if a client is compromised such that both the
image and user-clicked points can be captured. Like many
other graphical passwords such as CCP and PCCP, CaRP
schemes using the basic CaRP authentication are vulnerable
to phishing since user-clicked points are sent to the
authentication server. However, CaRP schemes such as
TextPoints4CR used with challenge-response authentication
are robust to phishing to a certain level: a phishing
adversary has to mount offline guessing attacks to find out
the password using the verifiable data obtained through a
successful phishing attack.
V. Recognition-Recall Carp
In recognition-recall CaRP, a password is a sequence of
some invariant points of objects. An invariant point of an
object (e.g. letter “A”) is a point that has a fixed relative
position in different incarnations (e.g., fonts) of the object,
and thus can be uniquely identified by humans no matter
how the object appears in CaRP images. To enter a
password, a user must identify the objects in a CaRP image,
and then use the identified objects as cues to locate and click
the invariant points matching her password. Each password
point has a tolerance range that a click within the tolerance
range is acceptable as the password point. Most people have
a click variation of 3 pixels or less [18]. Text Point, a
recognition recall CaRP scheme with an alphabet of
characters, is presented next, followed by a variation for
challenge response authentication.
Authentication: When creating a password, all clickable
points are marked on corresponding characters in a CaR
Pimage for a user to select. During authentication, the user
first identifies her chosen characters, and clicks the
password points on the right characters. The authentication
server maps each user-clicked point on the image to find the
closest click able point. If their distance exceeds a tolerable
range, login fails. Otherwise a sequence of clickable points
is recovered, and Its hash value is computed to compare
with the stored value. It is worth comparing potential
password points between Text Points and traditional click-
based graphical passwords such as Pass Points [5]. In Pass
Points, salient points should be avoided since they are
readily picked up by adversaries to mount dictionary
attacks, but avoiding salient points would increase the
burden to remember a password. This conflict does not exist
in Text Points. Clickable points in Text Points are salient
points of their characters and thus help remembera
password, but cannot be exploited by bots since they are
both dynamic (as compared to static points in traditional
graphical password schemes) and contextual:
Dynamic: locations of clickable points and their contexts
(i.e., characters) vary from one image to another. The
clickable points in one image are computationally
independent of the clickable points in another image, as
wewill see in Section VI-B.
Contextual: Whether a similarly structured point is
aclickable point or not depends on its context. It is onlyif
within the right context, i.e., at the right location of aright
character these two features require recognizing the correct
contexts,i.e., characters, first. By the very nature of Captcha,
recognizingcharacters in a Captcha image is a task beyond
computer’scapability. Therefore, these salient points of
characters cannotbe exploited to mount dictionary attacks on
TextPoints.
sB. TextPoints4CR
For the CaRP schemes presented up to now, the coordinates
of user-clicked points are sent directly to the authentication
server during authentication. For more complex protocols,
saye challenge-response authentication protocol, a response
is sent to the authentication server instead. TextPoints can
be modified to fit challenge-response authentication. This
variation is called Text Points for Challenge-Response or
TextPoints4CR.Unlike Text Points wherein the
authentication server stores a salt and a password hash value
for each account, the server in TextPoints4CR stores the
password for each account. Another difference is that each
character appears only once in a TextPoints4CR image but
may appear multiple times in a Text Points image. This is
because both server and client in TextPoints4CR should
generate the same sequence of discredited grid-cells
independently. That requires a unique way to generate the
sequence from the shared secret ,i.e., password. Repeated
characters would lead to several possible sequences for the
same password. This unique sequence is used as if the
shared secret in a conventional challenge response
authentication protocol. In TextPoints4CR, an image is
partitioned into a fixed grid with the discretization grid-cell
of size μ along both directions. The minimal distance
between any pair of clickable points should be larger than μ
by a margin exceeding a threshold to prevent two clickable
points from falling into a single grid-cell in an image.
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Suppose that a guaranteed toleranceof click errors along
both x-axis and y-axis is τ, we requirethat μ ≥ 4τ.
VI. Results
Screen Shots:
FIG: USER LOGIN (enter password & captcha code):
FIG: Admin activating blocked user
VII. Discussion
In comparison to other graphical password schemes, such as
there are some advantages and disadvantages inour
improved scheme. One disadvantage is that it is
morecomplex and increases users’ memory load. Users have
toremember both the pass-images and pass-positions. To
beauthenticated, users need to recognize the pass-images
andinput the characters of the text-based CAPTCHAs on the
passpositionscorrectly. These factors have increased
thecomplexity of the login process. However, although it
iscomplex and cumbersome, the improved scheme is
stronglyresistant to spywares, which is our primary focus. A
comparison of login time for our scheme shows that,
ourscheme, as other graphical schemes, is longer than that
of textbasedschemes. However, when compared to other
graphicalpassword schemes our login time is shorter. For
instance, themean login time of CHC is 72 seconds and Déjà
vu is 27 to 32seconds because there are multiple rounds of
challenges inthese schemes [26]. In [18], a typical entry
takes over 3minutes using a high-complexity protocol and
over 1.5 minuteswith a low-complexity protocol. Moreover,
schemes againstspyware also challenge user’s memory
capacity to agreat extent. In [18], the high-complexity
protocol asks the userto remember 30 pictures. And in [20],
the user needs toremember 16 random strings for
corresponding 16 passimages.The mean login time of our
improved scheme is 22.04seconds. We believe that our
login times will decrease withfamiliarity with the scheme.
All experiments were undertakenin lab and all the
participants were new to our scheme. Theusers’ login speed
should be faster with the extended use.If the scheme is
moved to real usage, the settings of theparameters can be
adjusted to adapt to different securitydemands and
application situations. There are M imagesrandomly
generated including N pass-images, and there are Srounds of
challenges for one login this requires recording of hundreds
of logins andrecognition of a huge number of CAPTHCAs.
Gathering somuch information may take a long time and
recognizing theCAPTCHAs also needs an extensive
manpower. Certainly,increasing the setting for high security
is at the expense ofusability.
There are also some user behaviors which create risks forour
scheme. First, the passwords selected by user often
accordwith a particular trend. For example, in order to make
thepassword easily remembered, most users select the
sameposition for different pass-images, first or anterior
positions,consecutive positions or one position for each
pass-image. Andcertain images were selected by a number
of users as passimages.All the factors mentioned above can
reduce thepractical password space and increase the
possibility of“guessing” attacks.Second, we find that there is
always a significant time gapwhen entering characters
belonging to two different passimages.The reason is that
users are used to enter correspondingcharacters after he
finds a pass-image. Such a situation will berecorded and
utilized by spywares. This problem can be solvedby entering
characters by turns which belong to differentCATPCHAs in
a certain order.In summary, our improved scheme is
resistant to spywareattack, and the rules for setting
passwords have increased the cost and time of the human
intervention attack.
VII. Conclusion And Future Works
In this paper, we have presented a new approach to
protectuser’s password against spyware attack. Our main
contributionis that we introduce CAPTCHA into the realm
of graphicalpasswords to resist spyware programs. From a
securityviewpoint, this exploration is expected to advance
thedevelopment of graphical passwords. While the design
ofCAPTCHA is an interdisciplinary topic and the
currentcollective understanding of this topic is still in its
infancy, wedo not claim that our scheme is immediately
feasible.However, we believe that our method will enhance
currentsecurity and as CAPTCHA increases in effectiveness
ourmethod will also increase computer security.The results
of our experiments show that the future researchshould
concentrate on improving the login time and memo ability.
Furthermore, when a user inputs thecorresponding
substrings which belong to differentCAPTCHAs, the time
gap is longer than the time between two characters in one
substring. So a method for narrowing the timegap in the
entering process and reduction of the impact ofuser’s choice
trend on security, provide other areas for futureresearch.
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